Chinese Foreign Relations by Robert G. Sutter

Author:Robert G. Sutter [Sutter, Robert G.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
Published: 2012-03-03T16:00:00+00:00

New Zealand officials relied strongly on the United States to maintain a regional order that ensured that China would conduct its foreign relations in ways compatible with New Zealand’s interests in regional stability. Dealing effectively with China’s rise added to reasons for New Zealand officials to seek to improve New Zealand’s relations with the U.S. government. Against this background, the Barack Obama government initiated the most extensive upgrade of U.S. relations since the break in the alliance relationship in the 1980s—a move strongly supported by the New Zealand government.

The Pacific Islands

The broad outlines of Chinese policy toward the Pacific Islands became clear in the 1990s. China’s large and expensive diplomatic presence and foreign assistance efforts there far outweighed any Chinese commercial interests. Some strategists in New Zealand and Australia pointed to possible Chinese strategic interests, saying that China was endeavoring to establish stronger presence in this “island chain” that had some relevance to Chinese security, but that purported Chinese interest seemed remote. China did build a satellite-tracking station in 1997 in the equator-straddling country Kiribati, but China had to dismantle that operation a few years later when the island government switched sides and established diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Another obvious Chinese interest in pursuing relations with these small countries was to ensure their support in the United Nations and other international bodies on issues of importance to China. This included not only competition with Taiwan but also Chinese efforts to block Japan’s bid for a UN Security Council seat and a greater role in Asian, Pacific, and world politics. Japan, for its part, in recent years intensified aid and other efforts to build closer relations with the Pacific microstates.82

On balance, however, the main driver of Chinese interest in the islands seemed to center on one of the top priorities in Chinese foreign policy: competition with Taiwan for diplomatic recognition and regional support. In the 1990s, four regional states—the Solomon Islands, Nauru, Tuvalu, and Tonga—had long maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Tonga switched to Beijing in 1998. Nauru switched to Beijing a couple of years later, but then after a few years it switched back to Taiwan. The Marshall Islands switched from Beijing to Taipei in 1998. Palau also chose Taipei over Beijing. And Kiribati switched to Taiwan a few years after the opening of the Chinese embassy and tracking station in 1997. Others in the region—including such regional leaders as Papua New Guinea and Fiji—duly recognized China but had long-standing and high-level unofficial relations with Taiwan. In 2011, Taiwan was recognized officially by Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, the Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu. Based on its regional presence, Taiwan was able to act as an unofficial “special dialogue” partner with the main regional organization, the South Pacific Forum, and to maintain unofficial but cordial relations with other regional organizations, such as the Forum Fisheries Agency and the South Pacific Commission.

The most important recent development in China’s efforts to woo support from Pacific Island countries and undermine Taiwan’s influence came in Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s April 2006 visit to Fiji.

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